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Abstract. Self-healing group key distribution is a primitive aimed to
achieve robust key distribution in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) over
lossy communication channels. However, all the existing self-healing
group key distribution schemes in the literature are designed for
homogenous WSNs that do not scale. In contract, heterogeneous WSNs
have better scalability and performance. We are thus motivated to
study self-healing group key distribution for heterogeneous WSNs. In
particular, we propose the concept of hierarchical self-healing group key
distribution, tailored to the heterogeneous WSN architecture; we further
revisit and adapt Dutta et al.’s model to the setting of hierarchical
self-healing group key distribution, and propose concrete schemes that
achieve computational security and high eﬃciency.
Keywords: Heterogeneous wireless sensor network, self-healing group
key distribution, scalability.
1 Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have a wide range of potential applications,
such as battleﬁeld surveillance, wildlife tracking, healthcare monitoring, and nat-
ural disaster monitoring. A WSN consists of a large number of sensor nodes, each
being a small sensing device capable of collecting and reporting environmental
data to base station. Sensor nodes are extremely constrained in hardware, having
limited computation capability, storage capacity, and radio transmission range.
Worse yet, sensor nodes are usually powered by batteries, restricted power supply
is thus yet another major limitation of WSNs.
As WSNs are often deployed where there is no network infrastructure sup-
port, they are easily susceptible to adversaries who can intercept or interrupt
the wireless communications. It is thus crucial to ensure secure communication
when a WSN is used for mission-critical applications. A fundamental service to
achieve secure communication is key distribution, whereby sensor nodes establish
(secret) keys, to be used to encrypt and authenticate messages. Unfortunately,
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it is commonly acknowledged that key distribution in WSNs is not trivial, con-
sidering the resource-constrained nature of sensor nodes. Hence lots of eﬀorts
have been dedicated to the study of key management and distribution in WSNs
[6,7,9,8,12,15,18,19,20,21,27,28,31]. These methods are categorized into group
key distribution [6,9,15,20,21] and pairwise key distribution [7,8,12,18,19,27,31].
The former enables a group of sensor nodes to establish a common group key,
while the latter allows pairs of nodes to share distinct keys.
Among the existing group key distribution schemes, self-healing group key
distribution [9,21,28] particularly suits WSNs. A prominent property of this
type of group key distribution is self-healing, which allows group members to
recover lost group keys of past sessions based simply on the key update message
of the current session. This makes group key distribution resilient to the lossy
wireless channels of WSNs. Moreover, self-healing group key distribution oﬀers
group member revocation such that revoked group members can no longer get
the group keys for new sessions after their revocation. This feature is extremely
important in mitigating the eﬀect of sensor node compromises: amputate com-
promised sensor nodes from the WSN, so that the adversary acquiring the secret
information of the compromised nodes still cannot get the new group keys.
We observed that all the self-healing group key distribution schemes in the
literature considered homogeneous WSNs where all sensor nodes are assumed
to be of the same capabilities. However, homogeneous WSNs are not scalable.
Indeed, both theoretical and empirical studies have found that the throughput
of each sensor node decreases rapidly as the number of nodes increases, and as
the traﬃc becomes heavy, the control overhead due to the underlying routing
protocols will consume a large portion of the available bandwidth [11,13]. We
are thus motivated to study self-healing group key distribution in heterogenous
WSNs. A heterogenous WSN is composed of not only resource constrained sensor
nodes, but also a number of more powerful high-end devices. More speciﬁcally,
a WSN is partitioned into a number of groups/clusters, and a high-end device is
placed into each group, acting as the group manager/cluster head. Compared to
sensor nodes, a group manager is more powerful, and thus does not suﬀer from
the resource scarceness problem as much as a sensor node does.
Our Contributions. Tailored to the heterogeneous WSN architecture, we pro-
pose the concept of hierarchical self-healing group key distribution. In particular,
we formulate a security model for hierarchical self-healing group key distribu-
tion by revisiting and adapting Dutta et al.’s model [9]. We then propose a basic
and an extended scheme, both proven secure under the model. Our construction
basically follows Dutta et al.’s idea of a combination of a reverse and a forward
one-way hash chain, but we show that their model and scheme have some weak-
nesses, which are rectiﬁed in ours. Our extended scheme further exploits the
hierarchy of the heterogeneous architecture by secret-sharing the manger key of
each group among all group managers, so as to counter possible compromises of
group managers. To show that the (extended) scheme is eﬃcient for WSNs, we
implement the core (yet the most costly) element of the scheme upon MICAz
mote [24], and the experiments demonstrate satisfactory performance.
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2 Related Work
Key management and distribution is a security bootstrapping service, funda-
mental to many other security mechanisms in WSNs, hence tremendous eﬀort
has been dedicated to the study of this issue [7,9,8,12,18,19,20,21,27,31]. In gen-
eral, public key cryptosystems are too expensive for WSNs, and symmetric key
primitives such as secret key encryption or cryptographic hash function are of-
ten preferred. As such, key management and distribution in WSNs boils down
to sharing of secret keys among sensor nodes. To achieve this objective, a com-
monly used approach is to pre-load a set of secrets inside sensor nodes before
their deployment. These pre-loaded secrets are then used either directly as pair-
wise keys between each pair of sensor nodes, i.e., pair-wise key distribution
[7,8,12,18,19,20,27,31], or as a basis to establish new common keys shared by
a group of sensor nodes, i.e., group key distribution [6,9,15,20,21].
Among the existing group key distribution schemes, self-healing group key
distribution is particularly suitable for WSNs, because of its self-healing and
membership revocation properties. Staddon et al. [28] ﬁrst proposed the concept
and a concrete construction of self-healing group key distribution based on se-
cret sharing of two dimensional polynomials. Their construction, however, is not
eﬃcient, suﬀering from high communication and storage overhead. Liu et al. [21]
then generalized the security notions in [28], and presented a new scheme with
better eﬃciency by combining personal secret distribution with the self-healing
technique of [28]. Blundo et al. [4] analyzed the security deﬁnitions in [21,28]
and concluded that it is impossible for any scheme to achieve all of the security
requirements formulated in [21,28]. They then formulated a new deﬁnition for
self-healing group key distribution and came up with a new scheme [5]. Blundo
et al. [3] also showed an attack to the construction in [28] and discussed the
use of randomness in self-healing group key distribution schemes. Other schemes
based on the strategy in [28] include [25,14].
All the above self-healing group key distribution schemes are intended to
achieve information theoretic security. In [9], Dutta et al. proposed novel com-
putationally secure schemes, based on a combination of a reverse one-way hash
chain and a forward one-way hash chain. While Dutta et al.’s model is weaker
and cannot meet all the security requirements put forth in [21,28], their ap-
proach tremendously improves the eﬃciency of the information theoretically
secure schemes. Unfortunately, as we shall show in Section 3, Dutta et al.’s
deﬁnition on the secrecy of personal secrets in their model has some problems,
and we give two attacks on the secrecy of personal secrets in their scheme. The
schemes proposed by Du and He [10] followed Dutta et al.’s approach, and are
also subject to our attacks. Besides rectifying the problems in Dutta et al.’s
scheme, other diﬀerences between our schemes and Dutta et al.’s are as follows.
First, our schemes are hierarchical, tailored to the heterogeneous WSNs. Sec-
ond, our schemes achieve authenticated group key distribution, allowing every
non-revoked sensor node to verify whether or not its generated group keys are
valid, without requiring any extra communications.
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Fig. 1. Deﬁnition of Group Keys
3 Review and Analysis of Dutta et al.’s Scheme
3.1 Review of Dutta et al.’s Scheme
In Dutta et al.’s scheme [9], a WSN proceeds in sessions, and at the start of each
session the base station broadcasts a key update message to the sensor nodes,
enabling the latter to generate a new group key. Suppose the maximal number
of sessions supported by the WSN is m. The group key for the jth session is
deﬁned as gKj = hj(sF )+hm−j+1(sR), where h is a one-way hash function, and
sF , sR are random seeds (see Figure 1). Here, hj(.) = h(h(· · ·h(.)))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
j times
. It can be
seen that the hash chain associating with sR is used in the reverse order thus
called the reverse hash chain, and that associated with sF called the forward
hash chain. The details of Dutta et al.’s scheme are as follows.
– System Initialization. The base station chooses random seeds sR and sF ,
and it also selects m random t-degree polynomials f1(x), · · · , fm(x) ∈ Fq[x],
each corresponding to a session, where Fq is a ﬁnite ﬁeld with q being a
large prime number, and t is a system parameter denoting the robustness of
sensor nodes. The personal secret for a member sensor node i is deﬁned to
be Si = [f1(i), · · · , fm(i)]. Finally, the base station secretly sends Si and sF
to each node i.
– Broadcast. At the start of each session, the base station broadcasts a key
update message to enable sensor nodes to generate a new group key. Let
Rj = {i1, ..., iw} be the set of revoked sensor nodes upon the start of session
j ∈ {1, · · · ,m} and |Rj | = w ≤ t. The base station computes the following
polynomials:
rj(x) = (x − i1) · · · (x − iw)
bj(x) = h(sR)m−j+1.rj(x) + fj(x), (1)
where rj(x) is called the revocation polynomial. Finally, the base station
broadcasts the key update message Bj to all sensor nodes, where Bj =
Rj ∪ {bj(x)}.
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– Session Key Generation. Upon receipt of Bj, if node i is not revoked, it is
able to recover hm−j+1(sR) =
bj(i)−fj(i)
rj(i)
. Then it continues to compute the
group key gKj = hm−j+1(sR) + hj(sF ) using sF .
– Addition of New Group Member. A newly added member in session j is not
allowed to compute group keys of previous sessions. To add a new member
with ID α starting from session j, the group manager computes and gives
Sα = {fj(α), fj+1(α), · · · , fm(α)} and hj(sF ) to the node.
3.2 Attacks
In Dutta et al.’s model [9], the secrecy of personal secrets is deﬁned as any t
or less revoked members cannot compute the personal secrets of other members.
We next give two attacks, showing that their scheme cannot achieve the secrecy
of personal secrets. We also notice that the self-healing key distribution scheme
proposed by Du and He in [10] follow Dutta et al.’s approach, and our attacks
apply to their scheme too (to avoid repetition, we do not review their scheme).
Attack 1. In the above construction, the revocation polynomial rj(x) is simply
deﬁned as rj(x) = (x − i1) · · · (x − iw). Let fj(x) = atxt + · · · + a1x + a0. It is
clear that broadcasting bj(x) directly reveals at, at−1, · · ·, and aw+1. This means
that fj(x) only has w + 1 ≤ t unknown coeﬃcients, i.e., aw, · · · , a0, and any
w +1 (instead of t+1) revoked nodes together can determine fj(x) and in turn
compute fj(i) for any i. Therefore, the scheme cannot achieve the secrecy of
personal secrets.
Attack 2. Let us consider a particular non-revoked node i in session j. From
the broadcast message Bj , node i calculates h(sR)m−j+1 =
bj(i)−fj(i)
rj(i)
. Based
on h(sR)m−j+1, node i can actually compute any f(i′), i′ = i, as f(i′) =
bj(i′) − h(sR)m−j+1.rj(i′). This suggests that once the group key for a session
is established, the element of a sensor node’s personal secret corresponding to
that session is revealed to all other non-revoked nodes. As such, even node i is
revoked in a subsequent session, it already knows a part (albeit corresponding
to the past sessions) of other non-revoked nodes’ personal secrets.
4 Model and Security Definition
4.1 Heterogeneous Architecture
We consider the heterogeneous architecture, where a WSN is partitioned into
a number of groups. A high-end device is placed into each group, acting as the
group manager. Compared to sensor nodes, high-end group managers have rela-
tively higher computation capability, larger storage size, and longer radio range.
They also have longer power supply, and can even be line-powered in some cir-
cumstances, e.g., when a WSN is deployed to monitor a building, the group
managers can easily tap on the electricity lines to get power supply. Therefore
140 Y. Yang et al.
unlike sensor nodes, group managers do not suﬀer too much from the resource
scarceness problem. Depending on applications, hardware capabilities of a group
manager may vary from that comparable to a bluetooth device to that of a high
end PDA. The introduction of high-end group managers into a WSN makes the
once homogeneous network heterogeneous. The entire network including base
station, group managers, and sensor nodes forms a logically hierarchical archi-
tecture, as depicted in Figure 2.
Sensor
Nodes
Group
Managers
Base
Station
Fig. 2. Heterogeneous WSN Architecture
In this architecture, downlink messages broadcast by the base station directly
reach sensor nodes, whereas uplink messages sent by a sensor node to the base
stattion is forwarded via its group manager, which acts as an intermediary be-
tween the base station and the sensor nodes within its jurisdiction. A sensor
node may reach the group manager directly, or by traversing a short multi-hop
path. Intuitively, the inclusion of powerful group managers provides shortcuts for
data delivered from the sensor nodes to the base station, so the overall system
performance and in turn the lifetime of the network are expected to be greatly
improved. Indeed, numerous studies have corroborated the higher eﬃciency of
the heterogeneous WSN architecture, e.g., [16,26,29].
4.2 System Model
Three types of entities are involved in our hierarchical group key distribution
system: base station, group managers, and a large number of sensor nodes. The
sensor nodes are partitioned into a number of NG groups, and each group G
has a group manager,  ∈ {1, · · · , NG}. Each sensor node in a group is uniquely
identiﬁed by an ID number i, where i ∈ I ⊆ {1, · · · , n}, where I is the set of all
node ID numbers in G and n is the largest possible ID number in the system.
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Corresponding to the heterogenous architecture, the keys held by the entities
form a hierarchy, as shown in Figure 3: the base station holds a root key at level
2, each group manager has a distinct manager key at level 1, and at level 0 sensor
nodes in each group hold a group key during each session. A key at a lower level
is generated from the keys at higher levels, but not the other way around. This
key hierarchy helps to implement “separation of duty” within the system, e.g., it
is not necessary for the sensor nodes to process the control messages broadcast
by the base station to the group managers.
Level 2root key
Level 1
manager key
Level 0
group key
Base Station
Group Manager
Fig. 3. Key Hiearchy
A group manager takes charge of distribution of group keys within its group.
A group key is uniquely associated with a session. To distribute a group key
for a new session, the group manager broadcasts a key update message to all
its sensor nodes. The group key is then computed by a sensor node based on
the received key update message and its preloaded personal secret. Denote the
personal secret of sensor node i as Si, which is a vector of m elements with m
being the maximum number of sessions. Each element in Si corresponds to a
session and we use Si[j] to denote the element corresponding to the jth session,
j ∈ {1, · · · ,m}. Si[j] becomes obsolete once the group key for the jth session
is established; otherwise Si[j] is fresh. A sensor node can be revoked or non-
revoked, and only non-revoked sensor nodes can compute the group keys.
4.3 Adversary Model
As usual, we assume that the base station is trusted. In our basic scheme, the
group managers are also presumed trusted, but his assumption is removed in
the extended scheme. We are mainly concerned with the distribution of group
keys among sensor nodes. As such, we assume an adversary is able to passively
eavesdrop on, or actively intercept, modify, insert, or drop key update messages
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from a group manager to all its sensor nodes. We also allow the adversary to
compromise up to t sensor nodes in a group, where t is a system parameter.
4.4 Security Deﬁnition
We formally deﬁne the concept and security requirements of hierarchical self-
healing group key distribution, by revisiting and extending the deﬁnition in [9].
Deﬁnition 1. (Hierarchical Self-healing Group Key Distribution with t-
Revocation) Let NG, n,m, t be system parameters deﬁned as above. D is hi-
erarchical self-healing group key distribution with t-revocation, if the following
holds:
a. (Key Hierarchy) The manager keys held by the group managers are derived
from the root key of the base station, but it is computationally infeasible to
compute the root key from the manager keys. The same relationship should
hold between group keys and the corresponding manager key.
b. (Secrecy of Personal Secret) For any U ⊂ {1, · · · , n} in group G,  ∈
{1, · · · , NG}, if |U| ≤ t, then it is computationally infeasible for the nodes
in U to collectively determine the fresh elements of Si for any i /∈ U.
c. (Authenticated Generation of Group Key) Let gK,j be the group key of group
G for session j, and B,j be the broadcast key update message from the group
manager, where j ∈ {1, · · · ,m}. For any non-revoked sensor node i in the
group, gK,j is eﬃciently computed from B,j and Si[j] in an authenticated
manner. On the contrary, it is computationally infeasible to compute gK,j
from the key update message or a personal secret alone.
d. (t-Revocation) For any session j, let R,j be the set of revoked nodes in G
at the start of session j, where |R,j | ≤ t, it is computationally infeasible to
compute gK,j from the broadcast message B,j and {Si}i∈R,j .
e. (t-wise Forward Secrecy) Let U ⊆ {1, · · · , n} denote the sensor nodes which
joined G after session j. Given that |U| ≤ t, it is computationally infeasible
for all members in U to collectively compute gK,1, · · · , gK,j, even with the
knowledge of gK,j+1, · · · , gK,m.
f. (Self-healing) A non-revoked sensor node in G between sessions j1 and j2,
1 ≤ j1 < j2 ≤ m, can eﬃciently compute any gK,j, j1 ≤ j ≤ j2, from B,j2
and its personal secret.
Remark. Compared to Dutta et al.’s model, we distinguish between obsolete ele-
ments and fresh elements of a personal secret, and the secrecy of personal secret
in our deﬁnition actually mandates the secrecy of fresh elements. This diﬀerenti-
ation addresses our second attack, and suggests that personal secret should not
be used for purposes other than distribution of group keys, and once an element
is obsolete, it should be discarded immediately.
5 Basic Scheme
We ﬁrst present a basic hierarchical self-healing group key distribution scheme,
assuming that the group managers are trusted. We suppose that the set of
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revoked users is monotonic, i.e., a revoked user never rejoins the network. Let
Fq be a ﬁnite ﬁeld, where q is a large prime number. All arithmetic operations
below are performed in Fq. Let h, hR, hF : {0, 1}∗ → Fq be cryptographic hash
functions, and NG, n,m, t be system parameters. The basic scheme is a slight
extension of Dutta et al.’s scheme reviewed above, and rectiﬁes its weaknesses.
- System Initialization. The base station chooses a root key rK = [rk1, rk2],
where rk1 and rk2 are random numbers of appropriate length. For each
group G,  = {1, · · · , NG}, the base station computes a manager key as
mK = [mk,1,mk,2], where mk,1 = h(G, rk1) and mk,2 = h(G, rk2).
Clearly, it is computationally infeasible to compute the root key from the
manager keys. Then the base station securely passes the manager keys to
the corresponding group managers. We do not specify how this can be done,
but it often suﬃces by using some out-of-band channel.
Upon receipt of the manager keys, the group managers begin the preparation
for setting up group keys. In particular, the group manager for G whose
manager key is mK = [mk,1,mk,2] sets mk,1 to be the seed s,R of the
reverse one-way hash chain of length m + 1:
kj,R = hR(k
j−1
,R )
= hR(hR(k
j−2
,R )) = · · ·
= hjR(s,R), 1 ≤ j ≤ m + 1 (2)
and sets mk,2 to be the seed s,F for the forward hash chain of length m:
kj,F = hF (k
j−1
,F )
= hF (hF (k
j−2
,F )) · · ·
= hjF (s,F ), 1 ≤ j ≤ m (3)
The group key gK,j for session j ∈ {1, · · · ,m} is deﬁned to be gK,j =
km−j+1,R +k
j
,F = h
m−j+1
R (s,R)+h
j
F (s,F ). The group manager next selects m
random t-degree polynomials f,1(x), · · · , f,m(x) ∈ Fq[x], each correspond-
ing to a session. The personal secret for the member sensor node i is deﬁned
to be Si = [f,1(i), · · · , f,m(i)]. The group manager then sends Si, km+1,R and
s,F to each node i in a secure manner, e.g., preloading before the deployment
of nodes. Note that km+1,R will be used as the initial authenticator, denoted
as Γ, in subsequent group key generation process.
- Broadcast. The broadcast procedure for EACH group is almost the same
as in Dutta et al.’s scheme, with the main exception on the computation of
the revocation polynomial. In particular, let R,j = {i1, ..., iw} be the set
of revoked sensor nodes in G upon the start of session j ∈ {1, · · · ,m}
and |R,j| = w ≤ t. The group manager chooses a random set R′,j =
{i′t, · · · , i′w+1} ⊂ {1, · · · , n} \ I, where I is the set of all node IDs in G.
That is, the group manager chooses t − w random IDs that are not in that
group. Then, the revocation polynomial r,j(x) is computed as r,j(x) =
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(x − i1) · · · (x − iw)(x − i′w+1) · · · (x − i′t). It is clear that r,j(x) deﬁned as
such avoids our ﬁrst attack. b,j(x) is then computed with this r,j(x) as in
Dutta et al.’s scheme (Eqn. 1). Accordingly, the key update message B,j
also includes R′,j , i.e., B,j = R,j ∪R′,j ∪ {b,j(x)}.
- Session Key Generation. The main diﬀerence from that in Dutta et
al.’s scheme is that each sensor node in G holds an authenticator Γ. As
such, when a non-revoked node recovers km−j+1,R =
b,j(i)−f,j(i)
r,j(i)
, it validates
km−j+1,R using Γ: for example, if Γ = k
m+1
,R (the initial value)
1, then the
validation is to test Γ
?= hjR(k
m−j+1
,R ). Other steps remain the same as in
Dutta et al.’s scheme.
- Addition of New Group Member. This procedure is the same as in
Dutta et al.’s scheme.
Eﬃciency. This scheme is highly eﬃcient in terms of storage, communication,
and computation overhead. For storage, the personal secret together with the au-
thenticator accounts for (m+1) log q bits storage in each sensor node (compared
to Dutta et al.’s scheme, ours only needs log q-bit more storage for the authen-
ticator). For communications, our scheme generates t(log q + log n) ≈ t log q bits
key update message (since n 
 q), which is almost the same as the bit length
of the key update message in Dutta et al.’s scheme. For computation, no costly
public key primitive is involved in our scheme, and the computation overhead
inﬂicted upon sensor nodes includes only cryptographic hash function and poly-
nomial operations.
Security. For security of the scheme, we have the following theorem and the
proof can be found in [30].
Theorem 1. The above construction is a hierarchical self-healing group key
distribution scheme with respect to Deﬁnition 1.
6 Extended Scheme
In the above basic scheme, we assumed that the group managers are trusted
and not compromised. We next deal with the potential compromises of group
managers in our system. There are two aspects to this problem: how to timely
detect break-ins to group managers and how to mitigate the damage once a
group manager is compromised. The ﬁrst aspect can be addressed along the
lines of cooperative intrusion detection techniques as proposed in [2,17,22]. We
next discuss to address the second aspect, and in particular how to mitigate the
damages caused by group managers’ compromises.
It should be clear that once a group manager is compromised, the manager key
it holds is unavoidably disclosed. In the basic scheme, since the manager key is
used to derive all group session keys, once the manager key is revealed, so does all
1 For better eﬃciency, a node should overwrite Γ by setting Γ = k
m−j+1
,R at the end
of the session key generation procedure.
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the derived group keys. As such, probably the best we can expect is that in case
a group manager is compromised in a certain session, only the group keys for
that and earlier sessions are revealed, without aﬀecting subsequent sessions. Note
that since we desire self-healing, it is inevitable that disclosure of the manager
key in a session leads to the disclosure of the group keys for all earlier sessions.
To this end, the manager key of a group should be sessional too, rather than
a constant quantity as in the basic scheme2. According to this rationale, we
propose the following approaches to address the issue of compromises of group
managers.
6.1 Naive Approach
A naive approach is to involve the base station into distributing the sessional
manager keys to the group managers. Speciﬁcally, at the initialization phase, the
base station generates s,R and s,F for each group G using the root key, as per
the basic scheme, i.e., s,R = h(G, rk1) and s,F = h(G, rk2). However, the base
station does not pass s,R to the group manager, but keeps it to itself. For each
session j ∈ {1, · · · ,m}, the base station computes km−j,R = hm−jR (s,R) (Eqn. 2)
and sends it to the corresponding group manager. Here we assume a secure
communication channel between the base station and each group manager. Then,
the sessional manager key held by the group manager is mK,j = [k
m−j
,R , s,F ].
Using km−j,R , the group manager computes and broadcasts k
m−j+1
,R = hR(k
m−j
,R )
to the sensor nodes as in the basic scheme (Eqn. 1), which enables the nodes to
compute group key gK,j = k
m−j+1
,R +k
j
,F . It is easy to see that the manager keys
thus generated sustain key hierarchy, and compromise of mK,j does not disclose
group keys for sessions later than j + 1. This is almost the best we can expect.
This approach is quite simple. However, the involvement of the base station
oﬀsets the beneﬁts oﬀered by the heterogeneous architecture, one of which is to
dispense with the implication of the base station into the management (including
security enforcement) of individual groups. The involvement of the base station
may result in single point of failure, in the sense that once the adversary manages
to block the base station by, e.g., DoS attacks, the whole system is crashed.
6.2 An Extended Scheme
The extended scheme tries not to get the base station involved, as in the ba-
sic scheme. As such, secret-sharing s,R of each group among multiple group
2 One may argue that since the group manager is the only party that takes charge of
the distribution of group session keys, once the group manager is compromised, all
subsequent sessions of that group will fall to the control of the adversary, regardless
of the measures taken to protect the manager key. This argument is actually based
on the assumption that the adversary can continue controlling the compromised
group manager. We, however, expect that the base station can timely detect the
compromised group manager (e.g., using the cooperative intrusion detection tech-
niques) and recover it in a certain later session. In fact, we believe that a WSN in
real application should achieve this. Our extended schemes aim to work in such a
scenario.
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managers seems to be the only possible solution. The approach should satisfy
that at no time should s,R be reconstructed at any group manager including
the one it belongs to. This requires computing kj,R, j = 1, · · · ,m, in a dis-
tributed way, while without reconstructing s,R. It is clear that if hR() is a regu-
lar cryptographic one-way hash function, it is quite hard (if possible) to compute
kj,R = h
j
R(s,R) as required. We have to ﬁnd a special hR() that facilitates the
desired distributed computation.
Our choice for hR() is hR : ZN → QRN , and in particular hR(x) = x2
(mod N), where N is a product of two large primes such that factorization of N
is computationally intractable, and x’s are suﬃciently large numbers in ZN . In
such a case, hR(.) is a one-way function, under the intractability assumption of
computing square root modulo a composite. The well known Rabin encryption
is based on this assumption. hR(.) thus deﬁned has the following property: sup-
pose s,R has t′ multiplicative shares π1, · · · , πt′ such that s,R = π1 × · · · × πt′
(mod N), then hjR(s,R) = (s,R)
2j = (π1)2
j×· · ·×(πt′)2j (mod N). This prop-
erty well meets our need of computing hjR(s,R) without reconstructing s,R. By
using this hR(.), we next highlight the main idea of our scheme. The commu-
nication channel among the group managers is assumed secure. Let us further
suppose that we oﬀer t′-robustness to our system, i.e., the adversary does not
recover s,R unless compromising t′ or more group managers, where t′ is a system
parameter.
- System Initialization. The base station selects the root key and computes
s,R and s,F for each group G, as in the basic scheme. To secret-share s,R
among all group managers, the base station partitions s,R into t′ shares
π1, · · · , πt′ such that s,R = π1 × · · · × πt′ (mod N); then securely sends
π1 together with s,F to the group manager of G, and sends each of the
remaining shares to (NG − 1)/(t′ − 1) other group managers. That is,
the shares, except the one held by the group manager of G, are evenly
distributed among the remaining NG − 1 group managers. Note that this
oﬀers resilience to the share availability, in the sense that loss of some shares
does not aﬀect computation of the manager keys. This also gives a higher
weight to π1 held by the group manager of G, without which the group
session keys cannot be computed.
The steps taken by the group managers in preparation for setting up
group keys are the same as in the basic scheme.
- Broadcast. In session j, the group manager of G asks other group managers
to help generate km−j,R = h
m−j
R (s,R) as follows: each group manager raises
the share πi at its disposal to the power of 2m−j, i.e., ζi = π2
m−j
i , and
passes the result to the group manager of G, who then computes k
m−j
,R by
pooling (multiplying) together a combination of appropriate ζi’s (including
its own). The pooling procedure has to ﬁlter out redundant and erroneous
shares. We stress that there are many means to detect erroneous shares,
e.g., in the initialization phase, the base station gives the group manager of
G an authenticator for each share. The manager key mK,j is then set to
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mK,j = [k
m−j
,R , sF ]. The remaining steps are the same as in the above naive
approach.
- Session Key Generation & Addition of New Member. These steps
remain the same as in the basic scheme and the naive approach.
Security: Security of this approach is straightforward, given the security of the
basic scheme. We only point out that in this approach, t-revocation is based
on the intractability assumption of computing square root modulo a composite,
instead of the one-way-ness of the cryptographic hash function.
Experimental Results: In both of the basic and the extended schemes, the
bit length of q should be at least equal to that of hR(.), i.e., |q| ≥ |hR(.)|. For
the basic scheme, since hR(.) can be instantiated by a regular cryptographic
hash function, it suﬃces that |q| = 161, assuming |hR(.)| = 160. However, in the
extended scheme, |hR(.)| = |N |. To make factorization of N hard, |N | should be
at least 1024 bits, so should be |q|. We thus need to examine the actual eﬃciency
of the extended scheme.
For computation overhead, squaring operations (i.e., computing hR(.)) dom-
inate the workload of sensor nodes. Note that although a squaring operation is
an exponentiation, it is essentially also a multiplication operation. Thus in prin-
ciple, squaring operations are not deemed expensive. Nevertheless, as squaring
operations are the most costly part in our scheme, it still makes sense to gauge
their actual computation cost on real world sensors. To this end, we tested upon
MICAz mote [24] running TinyOS 2.0. Hardware conﬁguration of MICAz mote
includes a ATMega 128L (8-bit,8MHz) processor, 128K-byte program memory,
and 2.4 GHz radio transmission. Figure 4 lists the experimental results on the
timing of squaring operations over x’s of varying sizes, modulo a 1024-bit N . The
650
Size of x (bits) Timing (millisecs) Size of x (bits) Timing (millisecs)
26
700 32.5
750 39.7
800 51.3
850 59.6
900 71
950 83.2
1000 98.6
Fig. 4. Experimental Results
results indicate that a squaring operation takes less than 100 milliseconds, which
is quite satisfactory for WSNs. For storage overhead, each sensor node needs to
store the personal secret, each element of which is |q| = 1024 bits. Recall that the
MICAz mote we experimented upon has 128K-byte program memory. Even the
mote allocates 8K-byte program memory to store personal secrets, the network
can have approximately 60 sessions.
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7 Conclusion
Both experimental and theoretical studies have shown that heterogeneous WSNs
have better scalability and performance than homogenous ones. However, all
existing self-healing group key distribution schemes consider homogenous WSNs.
We were thus motivated to study hierarchical self-healing group key distribution
for heterogenous WSNs. In particular, we formulated a model for hierarchical
self-healing group key distribution, and proposed concrete schemes that achieve
computational security (instead of information theoretic security as in previous
schemes in the literature) and high eﬃciency.
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